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THE DANGEROUS PATIENT EXCEPTION TO THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: THE
TARASOFF DUTY AND THE JAFFEE FOOTNOTE
George C. Harris*
Abstract: With the U.S. Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Jaffee v. Redmond, all U.S.
jurisdictions have now adopted some form of evidentiary privilege for confidential statements by
patients to psychotherapists for the purpose of seeking treatment. The majority of states,
following the decision of the Supreme Court of California in Tarasoffv. Regents of the University
of Caitfornia,have also adopted some form of duty by psychotherapists to breach confidentiality
and warn potential victims against foreseeable violence by their patients. Largely unresolved is
whether there should be a dangerous patient exception to the evidentiary privilege parallel to the
Tarasoffexception to confidentiality. This Article argues that exception to the evidentiary
privilege should be evaluated separately from the exception to confidentiality. Whether or not a
Tarasoffduty to warn existed at an earlier time, exception to the evidentiary privilege should be
made only where psychotherapists' testimony is necessary to prevent future harm to patients or
identified potential victims. Applying this standard, the dangerous patient exception generally
would not apply in criminal actions against patients, but would apply only in proceedings for the
purpose of protecting patients or third parties, such as restraining order hearings or proceedings
to hospitalize patients.

A patient with a history of violence tells his psychotherapist in the course
of treatment that his ex-girlfriend has gone too far this time and will regret
it. Believing that the ex-girlfriend is in real danger and being heedful of the
duty to protect a potential victim from foreseeable patient violence, the
therapist breaches confidence and contacts the local police and the exgirlfriend. Despite the warning, she is found murdered a week later.
Circumstantial evidence points to the patient, who now is on trial. Should
the therapist be compelled, despite the psychotherapist-patient evidentiary
privilege, to testify about the patient's threat? Does the ethical and legal
duty to breach confidence and warn also require exception to the
evidentiary privilege? Or should the evidentiary exception be considered
separately from the duty to warn; and, if so, is it similarly justified?
These and related questions arise from the collision of two doctrines,
both recently developed but well-established, that regulate the
confidentiality of the psychotherapeutic relationship. Beginning in the
1960s and culminating with the U.S. Supreme Court's 1996 decision in
Jaffee v. Redmond,' every U.S. jurisdiction has recognized some form of
* B.A., Yale University, 1974; M.A.T., Brown University, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1982;
Associate Professor, University of Utah College of Law. The writing of this Article was supported by
the University of Utah College of Law Research Fund. I wish to thank my colleagues Paul Cassell,
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evidentiary privilege for statements made by a patient to a psychotherapist
for the purpose of obtaining treatment.2 During roughly the same period of
time, most states, either by case law or statute, adopted some form of a duty
by therapists to breach confidentiality and warn or protect potential victims
against foreseeable violence by their patients.3 Such a duty was first
recognized by the Supreme Court of California in the seminal decision,
Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California.4 Largely unconsidered
in case law or statute is how these two doctrines should be reconciled.
Should there be a "dangerous patient" or "future crime" exception to the
psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege where disclosure of the
patient's confidence is, or was at one time, necessary to prevent harm to the
patient or others? If so, what parameters should define that exception?
The U.S. Supreme Court broached the issue cryptically in Jaffee. With
apparent deference to the Tarasoffduty and without explanation or analysis,
the Court predicted in footnote dicta that exceptions to the privilege would
include the circumstance in which "a serious threat of harm to the patient
or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist." 5
The issue has been raised in one post-Jaffee federal decision. In United
States v. Glass, the Tenth Circuit, relying on the Jaffee footnote, implicitly
upheld the exception to the privilege anticipated by Jaffee and remanded the
case for evidentiary findings as to whether the exception was appropriate
in the circumstances of that case.6
Most state statutes establishing a psychotherapist-patient privilege are
silent as to whether there is a dangerous patient exception to the privilege
Some states do, however, create statutory exception to psychotherapistLeslie Francis, Lee Teitelbaum, and Dean Scott Matheson for their helpful comments on a draft of this
Article.
1. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
2. See generally Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242
(1972) [hereinafter ProposedRules] (comment to proposed federal psychotherapist-patient privilege,
citing 1966 Connecticut statute, 1961 Georgia statute, and 1967 Illinois statute as illustrative).
3. See Allison L. Almason, Comment, PersonalLiabilityImplicationsof the Duty to Warn Are Hard
Pills to Swallow: From Tarasoff to Hutchinson v. Patel and Beyond, 13 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y
471,477-78 nn.46-47 (1997).
4. The Supreme Court of California heard the Tarasoffcase twice and issued two opinions: 529 P.2d
553 (Cal. 1974) (en banc) [TarasoffI] and 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en bane) [TarasoffII](vacating
Tarasoff1).
5. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.
6. 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998). The author was amicus curiae by appointment of the court in
Glass.
7. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
patient confidentiality, if not the privilege, for preventing harm.8 Other
states define the psychotherapist-privilege as coextensive with the attorneyclient privilege, which generally includes a "crime-fraud" or "future crime"
exception.9 As on the federal side, little state case law addresses the
dangerous patient exception. The Supreme Court of California, however,
has applied a statutory exception to the evidentiary privilege to compel
testimony by a psychotherapist against a patient in criminal proceedings
against the patient." Oregon, which has no statutory exception, has rejected
an implied exception and distinguished the evidentiary privilege from the
duty to warn."
With the exception of the California and Oregon decisions, few courts or
commentators have discussed the "dangerous patient" issue in an
evidentiary context. In particular, very little commentary or analysis
addresses whether exception to the evidentiary privilege should follow or
be evaluated separately from the exception to confidentiality, inherent in the
Tarasoffduty. The Jaffee footnote appears to equate uncritically exception
to the privilege with the Tarasoffexception to confidentiality. The social
purposes and professional dynamics of the two exceptions are, however,
significantly different. It is one thing for a psychotherapist to contact law
enforcement or a potential victim to prevent a patient from carrying out
dangerous, criminal intentions, and quite another to compel the therapist to
testify to confidential conversations with the patient in a later criminal
proceeding against the patient.
Part I of this Article reviews the history of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the dangerous patient exception, and the Tarasoffduty to warn. Part
II analyzes the dangerous patient exception in light of the foundations of the
privilege and the justifications that have been or might be advanced for the
exception, including the Tarasoff duty to warn, theories of waiver, and
analogy to exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. Part I concludes that
exception to the evidentiary privilege for psychotherapist-patient
communications should be evaluated separately from the psychotherapist's
ethical or legal duty to take steps to prevent her patient from doing foreseeable
harm to others. It argues that the Jaffee footnote dicta should be construed
8. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
10. See Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786 (Cal. 1992) (en banc); People v. Wharton, 809
P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991) (en banc).
11. See Oregon v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225 (Or. 1985).
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strictly to make exception to the evidentiary privilege only when disclosure
through testimony in the proceeding at issue is necessary to prevent harm to
the patient or others, without regard to whether there may have been a
Tarasoffduty to warn at an earlier time. Part IV explores the application of the
exception and concludes that it should apply only in proceedings with the
specific purpose of protecting the patient or third parties, such as a restraining
order hearing or a proceeding to hospitalize the patient.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE AND THE DANGEROUS PATIENT EXCEPTION

During the past approximately thirty years, the psychotherapist-patient
evidentiary privilege has been established by statute or case law in all U.S.
jurisdictions. Whether there should be a dangerous patient exception to the
privilege remains, however, largely undecided.
A.

The FederalPrivilege

1.

ProposedRule 504

In late 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court submitted to Congress proposed
Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates (the
Proposed Rules) that "had been formulated by the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence and approved by the Judicial
Conference of the United States and by the Court."' 2 The Proposed Rules
set forth nine specific privileges, including the lawyer-client privilege
(Proposed Rule 503), the husband-wife privilege (Proposed Rule 505), the
privilege for communications to clergymen (Proposed Rule 506), and the
psychotherapist-patient privilege (Proposed Rule 504). 1" Rather than
adopting the specific proposed privileges, Congress enacted a single general
rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides that privileges "shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."' 4
While it rejected enumerating specific privileges in favor of an open-ended
rule, "the Senate Judiciary Committee explicitly stated that its action

12. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1996).
13. See ProposedRules, supranote 2, at 235-47.
14. Fed. R. Evid. 501.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
'should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a psychiatristpatient... privileg[e] contained in the [proposed] rules."I 5
Proposed Rule 504 specified three exceptions to the psychotherapistpatient privilege, for communications that are: (1) relevant to proceedings
to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, (2) made in the course of an
examination of the mental condition of the patient ordered by the judge, and
(3) relevant to an issue of the mental condition of the patient in a
proceeding in which the patient relies on that condition as an element of a
claim or defense. 6 It made no exception for threats to third persons or
communications regarding future crime.
That omission was deliberate. The exceptions allowed were patterned
after those in the then-existing Connecticut statute.
While it has been argued convincingly that the nature of the
psychotherapist-patient relationship demands complete security
against legally coerced disclosure in all circumstances, the committee
of psychiatrists and lawyers who drafted the Connecticut statute
concluded that in three instances the need for disclosure was
sufficiently great to justify the risk of possible impairment of the
relationship. These three exceptions are incorporated in the present
7
rule.'

The authors of the article cited by the Advisory Committee Notes,
Professors Goldstein and Katz of Yale Law School, were members of the
committee that drafted the Connecticut statute. They explained in the cited
article the decision not to include a "future crime" exception:
It should be noted that our committee deliberately chose not to write
a "future crime" exception into the bill. Its members were persuaded
that, as a class, patients willing to express to psychiatrists their
intention to commit crime are not ordinarily likely to carry out that
intention. Instead, they are making a plea for help. The very making
of these pleas affords the psychiatrist his unique opportunity to work
with patients in an attempt to resolve their problems. Such resolutions
would be impeded if patients were unable to speak freely for fear of
possible disclosure at a later date in a legal proceeding.'
15. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting S.Rep. No. 93-1277, at 13).
16. See ProposedRules, supra note 2, at 241.
17. Id. at 243-44 (citing Abraham S.Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-PatientPrivilege: The GAP
Proposaland the ConnecticutStatute, 36 Conn. B.L 175 (1962)).
18. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 17, at 188.
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This logic was apparently persuasive to the federal Advisory Committee.
As explained by one commentator: "[a]lthough some.., have argued that
the need for disclosure is paramount when possible harm is threatened,
Standard 504 proceeds on the assumption that less harm will ensue if
patients feel free to ventilate their intentions."' 9
2.

Jaffee v. Redmond

More than twenty years after the adoption of Rule 501, in Jaffee the
Supreme Court held for the first time that "confidential communications
between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of
diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule
501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."2 The Court was persuaded, in large
part, by the adoption of the privilege in all fifty states and by the fact that
the Advisory Committee had recommended a psychotherapist-patient
privilege in Proposed Rule 504.2
In the decision below, the Seventh Circuit had upheld the
psychotherapist-patient privilege but subject to case-by-case balancing.22
The privilege would not have applied under the Seventh Circuit's holding
if"in the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure of... a
patient's counseling sessions outweigh[ed] that patient's privacy
interests., 2 3 The Supreme Court rejected that qualification, reasoning that
case-by-case balancing would "eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege"
by making its application unpredictable.24
19. 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein'sFederalEvidence § 504[05], at 504-27
(2d ed. 1996, Release No. 35-8/89) (citation omitted).
20. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.
21. Id. at 14. In articulating the rationale for the privilege, the Court quoted at length from the
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 504:
As the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee observed in 1972 when it recommended that
Congress recognize a psychotherapist privilege as part of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
a psychiatrist's ability to help her patients "is completely dependent upon [the patients'] willingness
and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for [a psychiatrist] to function
without being able to assure... patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication.
Where there may be exceptions to this general rule... there is wide agreement that confidentiality
is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment."
Id. at 10-11 (citing Proposed Rules, supra note 2, at 242) (quoting Group for Advancement of
Psychiatry, Rep. No. 45, Confidentiality and Privileged Communication in the Practice of Psychiatry
92 (June 1960)) [hereinafter ReportNo. 45].
22. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), aff'd, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
23. Id. at 1357.
24. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
The Supreme Court instead struck the balance categorically in favor of
protecting the privilege, and against the competing evidentiary value that
psychotherapist-patient communications might have in court proceedings.
It found "the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of
the privilege [to be] modest," and that "[i]f the privilege were rejected,
confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients
would surely be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the
circumstances that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result
in litigation."' The Court "agree[d] with the judgment of the state
legislatures and the Advisory Committee that a psychotherapist-patient
privilege will serve a 'public good transcending the normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."' 26
The Court declined to define the parameters of the privilege for all
purposes, and instead left such definition for development on a case-by-case
basis.2 7 It did, however, offer in dicta the following prediction regarding
potential limitations on the privilege:
Although it would be premature to speculate about most future
developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, we do not
doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way,
for example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can
be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.28
The Court did not discuss or acknowledge that Proposed Rule 504 had
rejected this dangerous patient exception, and offered no further gloss on
the anticipated exception or the parameters of its application.
Most significantly, the Jaffee Court gave no guidance as to when the
potential exception to the privilege-for a serious threat of harm that can be
averted only by means of a disclosure-should apply.29 Does a serious
threat of harm communicated by a patient to a therapist that warrants
disclosure to law enforcement authorities or the potential victim lose its
privileged status and become admissible in later proceedings against the
patient? Or should exception to the privilege be made only if disclosure in
the later evidentiary proceeding is also necessary to avert a serious threat of
harm? The Court left these questions unanswered.
25. Id. at 11-12.
26. Id. at 15 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,50 (1980)).
27. Id. at 18.
28. Id. at 18 n.19.
29. Id.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:33, 1999

The issue anticipated by the Jaffee footnote was taken up in United
States v. Glass, a criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) for
threatening to kill the President of the United States.3" The defendant, Glass,
upon voluntary admission to a psychiatric hospital, had told the examining
psychotherapist that "he wanted to get in the history books like Hinkley
[sic] and wanted to shoot Bill Clinton and Hilary [sic]."'" The therapist
made no report of this threat to authorities, either at the time that Glass was
admitted to the hospital or several days later when he was released after
Glass had "agreed 'to participate in outpatient mental health treatment while
residing at his father's home.'32
When an outpatient nurse, who was apparently privy to the statement
made by Glass regarding the President, discovered that Glass had left his
father's home, she notified local law enforcement.33 Secret Service agents
subsequently interviewed the admitting psychotherapist, who disclosed to
them the threatening statement made by Glass. 34 Glass was then charged
under 18 U.S.C. § 87 1(a) with threatening to kill the President.3
The anticipated testimony by the psychotherapist comprised the sole
evidence that Glass had violated the statute. Glass moved to exclude that
testimony as violating the psychotherapist-patient privilege, recently
announced at that time for the federal courts in Jaffee.36 Without benefit of
an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, relying on the
Jaffee footnote and concluding that "under such compelling circumstances
as those presented here of 'an express threat to kill a third party by a person
with an established history of mental disorder,' that the 'broad privilege
recognized by Jaffee is inapplicable.' , 37 Glass then made a conditional
guilty plea, preserving the right to raise the privilege issue on appeal.3 8
30. 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998). Section 871(a) provides in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for delivery... any threat
to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States... or
knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President... shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1994).
31. Glass, 133 F.3dat 1357.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1357.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the privilege announced in Jaffee,
a civil case, applied to the circumstances of Glass, a criminal case.39
Implicitly accepting the dangerous patient exception anticipated by the
Jaffee footnote, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the district court "to
determine whether, in the context of this case, the threat was serious when
it was uttered and whether its disclosure was the only means of averting
harm to the President when the disclosure was made."' The court

apparently made no distinction between exception to confidentialitywhether the psychotherapist was justified in making disclosure to law
enforcement authorities-and exception to the evidentiary privilegewhether the psychotherapist could be compelled to testify to confidential

communications in later criminal proceedings against the patient.4 1 Under
the terms of the remand, if the disclosure by the therapist to the Secret
Service was warranted when made as "the only means of averting harm to
the President,"4 2 the psychotherapist's testimony relating to the patient's
confidential communications apparently also would be admissible in the
criminal prosecution of the patient.
B.

The Privilege as Adopted by the States

As noted by the Court in Jaffee, all fifty states have enacted some form
of psychotherapist privilege.43 A number of states have patterned their
statutes after Proposed Rule 504.' Some states have created a balancing test
39. Id. at 1359.
40. Id. at 1360.
41. In remanding, the court focused on whether the therapist's disclosure to the Secret Service was
necessary to prevent harm to the President at the time of that disclosure, not on whether there was a
similar need to compel the therapist's testimony in later criminal proceedings. The court stated:
There is neither evidence of an affirmative effort by the psychotherapist to avert the threat of harm
nor of how the Secret Service only averted the threat through its disclosure. That is, on the record
before us, we have no basis upon which we can discern how ten days after communicating with his
psychotherapist, Mr. Glass' statement was transformed into a serious threat of harm which could
only be averted by disclosure.
Id. at 1359.
42. Id. at 1360.
43. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12&n.11 (1996).
44. See Alaska R. Evid. 504; Ark. R. Evid. 503; Del. Unif R. Evid. 503; Haw. R. Evid. 504.1; Idaho
R- Evid. 503; Ky. R. Evid. 507; Me. R. Evid. 503; Miss. R. Evid. 503; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-504 (1995);
N.M. R. Evid. 11-504; N.D. R. Evid. §503; Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2503 (1991); Or. R. Evid. 504; S.D.
Codified Laws §§ 19-13-6 to 19-13-11 (Michie 1995); Tex. R. Civil Evid. 509; Utah R. Evid. 506; Vt.
R. Evid. 503; Wis. Stat. § 905.04 (1993-94).
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similar to that to which the Seventh Circuit adhered in Jaffee." Other states
have enacted statutes simply stating that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege will be afforded the same protection as the attorney-client
privilege.46
A handful of states provide a statutory exception to psychotherapistpatient confidentiality for serious threats of imminent harm to the patient or
third persons, although it is unclear whether or how these exceptions apply
in evidentiary proceedings. Connecticut, whose failure to include a
dangerous patient exception to its evidentiary privilege was a model for the
proposed federal privilege, now provides that a patient's consent is not
necessary for disclosure "[i]f the psychologist believes in good faith that
there is risk of imminent personal injury to the person or to other
individuals or risk of imminent injury to the property of other
individuals. 47 Statutes in Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, West
Virginia, and Wyoming provide similar exceptions of varying scope. 4 The
Tennessee statute provides the most well-defined and rigorous conditions
for disclosure. It requires that the "patient has made an actual threat to
physically harm an identifiable victim or victims" and that "[t]he treating
psychiatrist makes a clinical judgment that the patient has the apparent
capability to commit such an act and that it is more likely than not that in
the near future the patient will carry out the threat;" it allows disclosure
49
only "to the extent necessary to warn or protect any potential victim.

45. Virginia, for example, allows for exception to the privilege when "a court, in the exercise of sound
discretion, deems such disclosure necessary to the proper administration of justice." Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-400.2 (Michie 1998); see also, e.g., W. Va. Code § 27-3-1(b)(3) (1997) (allowing disclosure if
"information is sufficiently relevant to a proceeding before the court to outweigh the importance of
maintaining the confidentiality established by this section").
46. See, e.g., Ala. Code Ann. § 34-26-2 (Michie 1997); Ariz_ Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-2085 (West 1998);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74-5323 (1992); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-807 (1997); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4507 (McKinney
1992); Wash. Rev. Code § 18.83.110 (1998).
47. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146c(c)(3) (West 1991).
48. See R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 5-37.3-4 (Michie 1997) (no consent necessary for disclosure by
"health care provider to appropriate law enforcement personnel, or to a person if the health care provider
believes that person or his or her family to be in danger from a patient"); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-1195(C)(3) (West Supp. 1997) ("provider may reveal ... the intention of the patient to commit a crime or
harm himself and the information necessary to prevent the crime or harm"); W. Va. Code Ann. § 27-31(b)(4) (Michie 1992) ("Confidential information may be disclosed... [t]o protect against a clear and
substantial danger of imminent injury by a patient or client to himself or another.... ."); Wyo. Star. Ann.
§ 33-27-123(a)(iv) (Michie 1997) (psychologist may disclose without express waiver "[w]here an
immediate threat of physical violence against a readily identifiable victim is disclosed to the
psychologist").
49. Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-207(c) (West 1998).

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Only California makes an exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege for threats of harm a part of its evidentiary code.5" The scope of
the California exception was litigated in People v. Wharton. The defendant
and amici curiae argued in that case that the California statute should be
interpreted to "permit therapists to warn potential victims in order to avert
potential danger, 'but to forbid any other use of such disclosures."'"2 The
Supreme Court of California rejected that interpretation based on the
language of the statutory exception, which provides:
There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has
reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or
emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or
property of another and that disclosure of the communication is
53
necessary to prevent the threatened danger.
The court reasoned that for communications meeting these conditions, no
privilege ever came into existence.' As a result, there was no privilege at
the time of later proceedings, even though disclosure was no longer
necessary to prevent the threatened danger.5
The Wharton holding was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of California
a year later in a decision regarding the celebrated murder trial of the
Menendez brothers. Applying the dangerous patient exception, despite the
fact that the psychotherapist had made no Tarasoffwarning to an intended
victim, the court in Menendez v. SuperiorCourt emphasized that application
of the dangerous patient exception to the evidentiary privilege did not
depend on actual disclosure having been made.56 Instead, the court held that
application depended only upon the existence of the factual predicate for
disclosure---"reasonable cause for belief by the psychotherapist in the
dangerousness of the patient and the necessity of disclosure."57 The
Menendez court fortified that conclusion with reference to the Tarasoff
50. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1024 (West 1995).
51. 809 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991) (en band).
52. Id. at 313.
53. Cal. Evid. Code § 1024 (emphasis added).
54. Wharton, 809 P.2d at 312-13 (en banc).
55. Id.; accordMenendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786, 794-95 (Cal. 1992) (en banc). Relying
on its earlier decision in People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127 (Cal. 1990), the Wharton court also held that
"once confidential communications are revealed by a therapist to a third party, such communications
lose their confidential status." 809 P.2d at 313.
56. Menendez, 834 P.2d at 796.
57. Id.
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decision, stating: "Plainly, the policies of the common law [enunciated in
TarasofJ] are similar to those of the 'dangerous patient' exception [to the
evidentiary privilege].' ' 58
Whether or not one accepts the logic of the California decisions, given
the particular structure and language of the California statute, it is not clear
that the same result would obtain in other states. In West Virginia, for
example, the statute merely provides that "[c]onfidential information may
be disclosed... [t]o protect against a clear and substantial danger of
imminent injury by a patient or client to himself or another., 59 Testimony
by the psychotherapist in a later civil or criminal proceeding against the
patient where the threatened harm has occurred and is the basis of the
prosecution,' unlike disclosure to law enforcement authorities or a potential
victim at the time of the threat, would not serve the purpose of protecting
against imminent injury. Thus, excluding California, it is not clear that even
those states that make exception for disclosure to prevent harm to third
persons would allow testimony by the therapist in a later criminal
proceeding against the patient. Indeed, if the distinction between
confidentiality and privilege is maintained, the existing statutes in states
other than California do not appear to compel such testimony.
Conversely, those states that make no explicit statutory exception for
testimony regarding danger to third persons could do so by judicial
construction. An implied exception was urged in Oregon v. Miller6' by the
prosecution, which attempted to introduce the testimony of a psychiatrist
regarding a phone call in which the defendant admitted to having just
strangled a victim. Relying on a psychotherapist's "ethical obligation to
divulge a patient's confidences whenever it might be possible to render aid
to a victim of the patient's violence," the trial court allowed the testimony.62
Distinguishing between the psychotherapist's ethical duties and the

58. Id.
59. W. Va. Code Ann. § 27-3-1(b) (Michie 1992). This provision is contained in chapter 27 of the
West Virginia Code, which is entitled "Mentally Ill Persons."
60. Exceptions would include a hospitalization proceeding, which is separately excepted under
Proposed Rule 504 and most state statutes, or a restraining order proceeding. See infra notes 67, 95 and
accompanying text. Arguably, the peculiar circumstance faced by the Tenth Circuit in UnitedStates v.
Glass, where the statute at issue made the threat itself a crime, would also be excepted. See supra notes
30-38 and accompanying text.
61. 709 P.2d 225 (Or. 1985).
62. Id. at 236.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
evidentiary privilege, however, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that it
was error to admit the therapist's testimony. 63
The Supreme Court of Oregon's holding in Miller was based largely on
the fact that the state rule at issue was modeled after federal Proposed Rule
504." Noting that the legislature had specifically provided for such an
exception to the attorney-client privilege but not to the psychotherapistpatient privilege, the court concluded that the legislature had considered and
rejected a future crimes exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.'
The Oregon court did not discuss the fact that the statute's enumeration
of exceptions to the privilege is specifically described as "a nonexclusive
list of limits on the privilege."66 Because the Millercase involved a criminal
prosecution against the patient, the court also had no occasion to consider
whether a different result would obtain in a proceeding designed
specifically for protection of the patient or a potential victim.67
II.

TARASOFF AND THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST'S DUTY
TO DISCLOSE

The now universal establishment of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
is founded primarily on acceptance of the social value of the therapeutic
relationship and the belief that confidentiality is essential to the
effectiveness of that relationship.68 The perceived social value of the

63. Id. The court further held, however, that admission of the psychotherapist's testimony was
harmless error. Id. at 240. The court therefore affirmed the patient's conviction. Id. at 245.
64. Id. at 236-37.
65. Id.; cf Shaw v. Glickman, 415 A.2d 625 (Md. App. 1980) (dismissing claim against psychiatrist
for failure to warn on grounds that disclosure would have violated privilege statute); State v. Beatty, 770
S.W.2d 387 (Mo. App. 1989) (distinguishing breach of confidentiality from evidentiary privilege and
holding no violation of state's evidentiary patient-physician privilege when defendant's psychiatrist
called private crime reporting agency to report defendant's crime).
66. Or. R. Evid. 504(4).
67. Unlike Proposed Rule 504, the Oregon statute makes no specific exception for hospitalization
proceedings. CompareProposed Rules, supra note 2, at 241 (Proposed Rule 504(d)(1)), with Or. R.
Evid. 504(4).
68. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) ("Effective psychotherapy.., depends upon an
atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete
disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.... [Tihe mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment."); Proposed Rules,
supra note 2, at 242 ("Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidentiality.
His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to talk freely.
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therapeutic relationship includes protecting potential victims of dangerous
patients, based on the belief that a patient's opportunity to vent dangerous
intentions coupled with the therapist's opportunity to intervene may be the
most effective of means to prevent threatened violence from occurring.69
Concern for potential victims of dangerous psychiatric patients has,
however, also given rise to a competing doctrine that compels disclosure of
patient confidences. At the same time that state legislatures, and now the
federal courts, have established an evidentiary privilege to protect the
confidentiality of the therapeutic relationship, tort law in a growing number
of states, following Tarasoff, has given therapists a duty to breach
confidence and warn and/or protect foreseeable victims of their patients'
violence.
The Supreme Court of California heard the Tarasoff case twice and
issued two opinions. TarasoffI, issued at the end of 1974, held that a
therapist has a duty to warn a potential victim when "in the exercise of his
professional skill and knowledge, [the therapist] determines, or should
determine, that a warning is essential to avert danger arising from the
medical or psychological condition of his patient. 7 TarasoffII, which was
issued eighteen months later, replaced the duty to warn with a broader duty
to protect.71 The court held that "[w]hen a therapist determines, or pursuant
to the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient presents
a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use
reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger., 72 This
duty to protect could be discharged in a number of ways, including
"warn[ing] the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the
danger,. . . notify[ing] the police, or... tak[ing] whatever other steps are
reasonably necessary under the circumstances. 73
Inherent, of course, in the duty to warn or protect is an exception to the
therapist's ethical and legal duties of confidentiality. In holding that a
This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being able to assure his patients of
confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication.") (quoting Report No. 45, supranote 21, at 92).
69. See Goldstein & Katz, supra note 17, at 188 (stating that patients' expressions of intent to commit
crime "affords the psychiatrist his unique opportunity to work with patients in an attempt to resolve their
problems"); 2 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 19, § 504[05], at 504-27 (noting that Proposed Rule 504
"proceeds on the assumption that less harm will ensue if patients feel free to ventilate their intentions").
70. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 555 (Cal. 1974) (en banc) [TarasoffI],
vacated, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) [TarasoffII].
71. Compare TarasoffII, 551 P.2d at 340, with Tarasoff1,529 P.2d at 555.
72. TarasoffII, 551 P.2d at 340.
73. Id.
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therapist has a duty to protect foreseeable victims of her client's violence
despite the therapist's duty of confidentiality, the Supreme Court of
California relied on the fact that the State's therapist-patient evidentiary
privilege, enacted in 1965, 74 provided a "dangerous patient" exception.75
The Tarasoffdecisions did not, however, address evidentiary issues that
might arise as a result of the newly recognized duty and its interaction with
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.76
As noted above, a majority of states now follow Tarasoff,either by
statute or case law.77 Decisions following Tarasoffaredivided on the scope
of the duty.78 For example, Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., a 1980 federal

district court decision applying Nebraska law, held broadly that a
psychotherapist has a duty to warn whenever he can "reasonably foresee
that the risk engendered by his patient's condition would endanger other
persons."7 9 That same year, in Thompson v. County of Alameda, the
Supreme Court of California itself held to the contrary that the Tarasoff
duty applies only when there is a threat to a specific, identifiable victim."0

74. Cal. Evid. Code § 1024 (West 1995).
75. The California Legislature has undertaken the difficult task of balancing the countervailing
concerns. In Evidence Code section 1014, it established a broad rule of privilege to protect confidential
communications between patient and psychotherapist. In Evidence Code section 1024, the legislature
created a specific and limited exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege:
There is no privilege ...if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is
in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of
another and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger.
Tarasoffll,551 P.2d at 346-47.
76. For example, assuming that no warning was made, a victim's estate might sue a therapist who
treated the perpetrator and seek to discover confidential communications between the perpetrator and
therapist establishing that the therapist knew or should have known that the perpetrator posed a danger
to the victim. The therapist presumably would object on the basis of the privilege. Whether the section
1024 exception applied would depend on whether "the patient [was] in such mental or emotional
condition as to be dangerous to [the victim]" and if "disclosure of the communication [was] necessary
to prevent the threatened danger." Cal. Evid. Code § 1024. Resolution of those evidentiary questions
would also largely determine whether the therapist was liable to the victim under the Tarasoffstandard.
77. See supranotes 44-46 and accompanying text.
78. See generally Jonathan Baumoel, Comment, The Beginning ofthe Endfor the PsychotherapistPatient Privilege, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 797, 806-12 (1992) (discussing post-Tarasoff case law
developments).
79. 497 F. Supp. 185, 194 (D. Neb. 1980).
80. 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980) (en bane); see alsoBrady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo.
1983), aff'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984) (reaching similar result applying Colorado law). Three years
after Thompson, however, in Hedlund v. SuperiorCourt,the California court held that the therapist's
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California and other states have taken steps to limit the scope of the
Tarasoffduty. Through a 1985 addition to its Civil Code, California now
provides that a therapist cannot be liable for "failing to warn of and protect
from a patient's threatened violent behavior or failing to predict and warn
of and protect from a patient's violent behavior except where the patient has
communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence
against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims."8 ' The statute goes on
to create a safe harbor for the therapist whose patient has made such a
threat, providing that, "[i]f there is a duty to warn and protect.., the duty
shall be discharged by the psychotherapist making reasonable efforts to
communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a law enforcement
agency."82 Most states that have adopted the Tarasoff duty have, like
California, limited the therapist's duty to instances in which the patient has
identified a specific victim."
While all states have enacted some form of a therapist-patient privilege
and most have recognized a Tarasoffduty to warn or protect foreseeable
victims, few have indicated how to reconcile the privilege with the duty.
Only a handful of states make statutory exception to psychotherapist-patient
confidentiality for threats of harm to the patient or to third persons, and
even in these states it is unclear whether and how those exceptions apply in
an evidentiary context. With the exception of People v. Wharton in
California and Oregon v. Miller in Oregon, there is little if any guidance on
whether a therapist will be compelled or allowed to testify in a proceeding
against the patient regarding threats of harm confided by the patient to the
therapist.
III.

SEPARATING THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE FROM THE
EVIDENTIARY EXCEPTION

While the Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond predicted a dangerous
patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, it did not
articulate a rationale for such an exception. The Court concluded in Jaffee
duty extends to close family members injured during an assault on the foreseeable and identifiable
victim. 669 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1983).
81. Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92(a) (West Supp. 1998).
82. Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92(b) (West Supp. 1998).
83. See Vikram S. Mangalmurti, Psychotherapists' Fear of Tarasoff All in the Mind?, 22 J.
Psychiatry & L. 379, 384 (1994); see also, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-517.02 (West 1997) (threat
of immediate serious harm or death to clearly identified or identifiable victim); Utah Code Ann. § 7814a-102 (Michie 1996) (actual threat of physical violence against reasonably identifiable victim).
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that the value of protecting the confidentiality of the therapist-patient
relationship"' should not be weighed on a case-by-case basis against the
truth-finding value of allowing disclosure, and instead struck the balance
universally in favor of the privilege." The Court agreed with the judgment
of the state legislatures and the Advisory Committee that a psychotherapistpatient privilege will serve a "public good transcending the normally

predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth."86 Given those conclusions, exception to the evidentiary privilege
must be justified by some value other than truth-finding.
Three rationales for a dangerous patient exception to the privilege could
be advanced: (1) where the conditions of the Tarasoff exception to
confidentiality and corresponding duty to prevent harm to third parties are
met, there should be a parallel exception to the evidentiary privilege;
(2) once a therapist discloses patient communications to third parties, the
communications should lose their privileged status; and (3) exception to the
therapist-patient privilege should be made by analogy to the crime-fraud or
future crime exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. This section
considers each of these rationales. It concludes that exceptions to the

84. The case for protecting the confidentiality of therapist-patient communications has been made
elsewhere and will not be repeated here. See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, supra note 18; Jennifer Sawyer
Klein, Note, "I'm Your Therapist, You Can Tell Me Anything". The Supreme Court Confirms the
Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 701 (1998).
85. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996); supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
86. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 (citation omitted). While Jaffee emphasized the social utility of protecting
effective therapist-patient relationships, some commentators have suggested that patients have a
constitutionally protected privacy interest or even a Fifth Amendment interest in the confidentiality of
the therapeutic relationship. See, e.g., Carolyn Peddy Courville, Comment, Rationalesfor the
ConfidentialityofPsychotherapist-PatientCommunications:TestimonialPrivilegeand the Constitution,
35 Hous. L. Rev. 187, 204-13 (1998) (reviewing privacy interests protected by privilege and arguing
that "statements made by the patient to his therapist that are then introduced in court by the therapist
should be regarded as coming from the patient himself" for Fifth Amendment purposes); Developments
in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications,98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450, 1480-83 (1985) (explaining privacy
rationale for privilege); see also United States v. D.F., 857 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D. Wis. 1994), aff'd, 63
F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1231 (1996) (holding that admission of adolescent's
"confession" made in course of psychiatric treatment and observation in government mental health care
facility would violate due process clause of Fifth Amendment).
There is some empirical research calling into question whether the effectiveness and utilization of
psychotherapy depends on protecting confidentiality. See Daniel W. Shuman & Myron F. Weiner, The
PrivilegeStudy: An EmpiricalExamination ofthe Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege,60 N.C. L. Rev.
893 (1982) (concluding that absence of privilege does not deter or delay therapy because most patients
are unaware of its existence); Daniel W. Shuman & Myron F. Weiner, The Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege:A CriticalExamination(1987) (presenting further empirical studies with similar conclusions).
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evidentiary privilege can and should be analyzed separately from exceptions
to confidentiality, and that a dangerous patient exception to the evidentiary
privilege is justified only when the psychotherapist's testimony in the
proceeding at issue is necessary to prevent future harm to an identifiable
victim or the patient.
A.

The Tarasoff Rationale

Many jurisdictions, consistent with the Tarasoff decision, have
concluded that protecting third parties from foreseeable violence by a
patient warrants disclosure by the therapist of otherwise confidential patient
communications to law enforcement authorities or the potential victim.87
Interpreting California's unique statutory structure, the Supreme Court of
California has held that communications subject to this exception to
confidentiality are also not protected by the therapist-patient evidentiary
privilege. Relying chiefly on the language of its Evidentiary Code-that
"[t]here is no privilege... if [the criteria for disclosure to protect the
patient or third parties are met] '' 8 8 -the Supreme Court of California in
People v. Wharton held that for communications that meet the criteria of
disclosure, no evidentiary privilege ever comes into existence.89 Indeed, in
California, the exception to the evidentiary privilege was the forerunner to
the duty to warn or protect. The Tarasoff decision, in announcing the
therapist's duty to protect foreseeable victims, relied on the previously
enacted exception to the evidentiary privilege as a declaration of public
policy that therapist-patient confidentiality must yield in the face of danger
to third parties.9"
Although cryptic, the Jaffee v. Redmond footnote can be read, similarly,
to treat the exception to confidentiality and the exception to the evidentiary
privilege as a single issue. It asserts that "the privilege must give way.., if
a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by
means of a disclosure by the therapist."'" Presumably, the U.S. Supreme
Court meant, as the Supreme Court of California concluded in Wharton and
Menendez, that if the conditions for disclosure are met at any time, the

87. See supra Part I.B.
88. Cal. Evid. Code § 1024 (West 1995) (emphasis added).
89. 809 P.2d 290, 312-13 (Cal. 1991) (en bane); see also supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
90. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346-47 (Cal. 1976); see also supra notes
70-76 and accompanying text.
91. 518 U.S. at 18 n.19 (emphasis added).

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
privilege is defeated. Under these conditions, the therapist could be
compelled to testify regarding the subject of the disclosure in all future
evidentiary proceedings, including criminal proceedings against the patient
for having carried out the threatened harm. This is the apparent holding of
the Tenth Circuit in UnitedStates v. Glass,9 following Jaffee.
The Jaffee footnote is ambiguous enough, however, to support another
reading. It can be interpreted, consistent with the decision of the Supreme
Court of Oregon in Oregon v. Miller, to apply the standard for an
exception--"if a serious threat of harm... can be averted only by means
of disclosure"-at the time of the proceedingthat raises the evidentiary
issue.93 If so read, even if the conditions for breach of confidentiality and
disclosure were met at an earlier time, there would be no exception to the
evidentiary privilege in later proceedings once the imminent threat of harm
had passed.
Should, then, exception to the evidentiary privilege and exception to
confidentiality consistent with the Tarasoff duty to warn be linked or
separated? Stated slightly differently, should application of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege to a patient's statements made for the
purpose of obtaining treatment depend, for all time, on whether the
statements represented a serious threat of harm when made by the patient?
Or should exception to the privilege be allowed only ifjustified to prevent
harm at the time of thepsychotherapist'stestimony?
Given the utilitarian balance already struck by Jaffee in creating the
privilege, the starting point of the analysis is straightforward. If the value
of maintaining the confidentiality of the therapeutic relationship justifies
any consequent loss of relevant evidence, an exception to the privilege
should not be allowed unless it would serve some other, overriding purpose.
In attempting to justify the dangerous patient exception to the evidentiary
privilege, in Menendez v. SuperiorCourt the Supreme Court of California
sought to identify its social purpose with the purpose justifying Tarasoff
disclosure: "[p]lainly, the policies of the common law are similar to those
of the 'dangerous patient' exception." 94 The Tarasoffpolicy purpose-the
prevention of harm to third parties-supports allowing, or even requiring,
that the therapist breach confidentiality to contact law enforcement

92. 133 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (10th Cir. 1998); see also supranotes 39-42 and accompanying text.
93. 709 P.2d 225, 236-37 (Or. 1985); see also supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
94. 834 P.2d 786, 796 (Cal. 1992).
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authorities and/or the intended victim at the time of a serious pending threat.
It also provides a rationale for allowing the therapist to testify to
confidential communications for the purpose of hospitalizing the patient,95
where the purpose is protecting both the patient and the general public, or
restraining order proceedings that seek to prevent the patient from
contacting the potential victim.
The Tarasoff rationale breaks down, however, when it is used, as in
Menendez and Wharton and as apparently contemplated by Jaffee, to justify
compelling the therapist to testify to confidential communications in
criminal proceedings against a patient who has carried out or attempted to
carry out a threat. Such after-the-fact testimony is not necessary to protect
the victim or potential victim, and the primary purpose of the proceeding is
punishment of the patient rather than protection of others.96 The social
utility of the therapist's testimony in a criminal proceeding against the
patient simply does not compare to the social utility of a Tarasoffwarning.
As one pair of commentators put it, in an article anticipating the Tarasoff
decision, "[S]ociety's interest in preventing threatened violence is infinitely
greater than its interest in making it easier to prove the commission of a
crime already committed."97
One could disagree with that assessment and argue that, at least in cases
involving defendant/patients who make credible threats of bodily harm,
there is great social utility in being able to prove the commission of crimes
in order to exact appropriate punishment and deter similarly situated
95. Proposed Rule 504 and many state statutes make explicit exception to the privilege for
hospitalization proceedings. Proposed Rule 504 makes exception for "communications relevant to an
issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the psycho-therapist in the course of
diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization." See ProposedRules,
supra note 2, at 241; see also Alaska R. Evid. 504(d)(4); Ark. R. Evid. 503(d)(1); Del. Unif. R. Evid.
503(d)(1); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.503(4)(a) (West 1998); Haw. R. Evid. 504.1(d)(1); Idaho R. Evid.
503(d)(1); Ky. R. Evid. 507(c)(1); La. Code. Evid. Ann. art. 510(B)(2)(g) (West 1995); Me. R. Evid.
503(e)(1); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-109(d)(1) (Michie 1997); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233
§ 20B(a) (Law. Co-op. 1986); Miss. R. Evid. 503(d)(1); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-504(4)(a) (Michie
1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:14B-28 (West 1998); N.M. R Evid. 11-504(D)(1); N.D. R. Evid.
§ 503(d)(1); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-13-9 (Michie 1995); Tex. R Civil Evid. 509(e)(6); Utah R. Evid.
506(d)(2); Vt. R Evid. 503(d)(1); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 905.04(4)(a) (West 1993); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-27123(a)(v) (Michie 1997).
96. As articulated by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Oregon v. Miller, the Tarasoffduty does not
"justify a full disclosure [of client confidences] in open court, long after any possible danger has
passed." 709 P.2d at 236.
97. John G. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, The Patientor His Victim: The Therapist'sDilemma, 62 Cal.
L. Rev. 1025, 1066 (1974) (making quoted comment in context of distinguishing psychotherapist's duty
to give patient waming regarding possible disclosure of patient confidences from police interrogator's
Mirandaduty).
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perpetrators. Consider, for example, the hypothetical with which this Article
began-the patient who has made threats of violence against his exgirlfriend to his therapist and is now on trial for her murder based solely on
circumstantial evidence. Evidence of a credible threat made before the
murder might well make the difference in whether the jury finds guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Assuming the patient's guilt, one might argue
that the social utility in bringing a murderer to justice is as high or nearly
as high as the protective purpose of the Tarasoffwarning.Or what if the
therapist's testimony could exculpate another defendant on trial for the
murder of the ex-girlfriend by identifying the therapist's patient as the true
perpetrator? Admitting the testimony in either situation could be considered
of high social value.
This punishment/deterrence argument merely reiterates, however, the
argument that the truth-finding value of compelling the therapist's
testimony should outweigh, in some circumstances, the value of protecting
the therapeutic relationship. The punitive/deterrence argument is consistent
with the balancing test adopted by the Seventh Circuit but rejected by the
Supreme Court in Jaffee. The Court correctly concluded in Jaffee that
"[m]aking the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's
later evaluation of the... evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate
the effectiveness of the privilege.""8
Even assuming that one could avoid case-by-case balancing and declare,
for example, an evidentiary exception for credible threats of violence in
murder cases, the rationale would still be that the evidentiary value of
psychotherapist-patient communications outweighs the value of protecting
patient confidentiality in certain circumstances. Such an exception would
be contrary to the policy judgments made by the Supreme Court in Jaffee
and the Advisory Committee in Proposed Rule 504-that the truth-finding
value of confidential psychotherapist-patient communications does not
justify compelling the therapist to testify in proceedings against the
patient. 99
Any argument based on the importance of obtaining convictions in cases
involving violent crimes is not, in any event, based on the protective
rationale of the Tarasoffduty unless the proceeding is one that will result

98. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996).
99. See supranotes 15-19,25-26 and accompanying text
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in affirmative steps to protect an identifiable potential victim.' 0 To the
contrary, central to the reasoning of the Advisory Committee, adopted by
the Court in Jaffee, was the conclusion that protecting the psychotherapistpatient relationship would also protect potential victims. Both the Court and
the Advisory Committee assumed that a patient who knows or ethically
must be informed that the therapist may later be compelled to testify to an
expression of violent intent will be much less likely to vent such intent and
allow for therapeutic intervention to prevent the threatened behavior.
Looked at from a slightly different perspective, compelling the therapist's
testimony would punish those suspects (guilty or not) who seek professional
help to deal with their dangerous thoughts and intentions.
The protective rationale of the Tarasoff duty supports a general
exception to the evidentiary privilege, applied without regard to the purpose
of the proceedings, only if the original circumstances of the dangerous
patient's communications to the therapist cannot be separated from the later
proceedings against the patient. But why not consider exception to the
evidentiary privilege separately from the therapist's ethical or legal duty to
breach confidence and warn law enforcement authorities or potential
victims of threats made by a patient? Medical commentators who are
cognizant of the ethical duty to protect potential victims but horrified by the
prospect of becoming witnesses against their patients have urged this
distinction.' There is no apparent reason why exception to the evidentiary
privilege cannot be considered in the context of the proceeding without
regard to whether there was or could have been an earlier breach of
confidence justified by exigent circumstances.
The Supreme Court of California in Wharton concluded that exception
to the evidentiary privilege should not be limited to circumstances or
proceedings with a protective function. The court reasoned that such a limit
would reward the patient for having carried out a murderous intent---"a
100. See discussion infra Part IV.
101. See, e.g., Gregory B. Leong et al., The Psychotherapistas Witnessfor the Prosecution: The
Criminalizationof Tarasoff, Am. J. Psychiatry 149:8, at 10 11, 1014 (Aug. 1992) (concluding that
possibility of being called as witness in criminal prosecution "will likely further distance
psychotherapists from treating difficult and dangerous patients" and that while "[i]t
may be acceptable
to warn potential victims in an attempt to avert tragedy,... it may well prove intolerable for therapists
to assume a prosecutorial rule long after the danger has dissipated"); Michele Smith-Bell & William J.
Winslade, Privacy, Confidentiality, and Privilege in Psychotherapeutic Relationships, Am. J.
Orthopsychiatry 64(2), at 180, 192 (Apr. 1994) (concluding in child abuse reporting context that
"confidentiality should be breached only to prevent current or potential danger to a child" and
"[tiherapists who report suspected child abuse by their patients should.., not be required to testify
against them in any subsequent criminal proceedings related to the past abuse").
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dangerous patient could regain the protection of the privilege by simply
killing his victim, certainly an absurd result."' 2 Insofar as the court was
suggesting that a patient, having uttered homicidal intentions to her
psychotherapist, would then carry out those intentions quickly to foreclose
the therapist's right to reveal them, the court's suggestion seems absurd.
The Wharton court appears to assume both that the patient will use quasilogical process and will make the proper distinction at the proper time
between breach of confidence and exception to the evidentiary privilege.
Given those assumptions, it seems highly unlikely that the patient would
take on the burden of the crime itself and the attendant danger of detection
merely to avoid the therapist revealing the confidential threats. Making
threats in confidence to a therapist is by itself no crime, °3 and a logical
patient will perceive much greater jeopardy in carrying out the crime.
Insofar as the Wharton court was merely asserting that a patient who carries
out a crime should receive no more evidentiary protection than one who
threatens to do so, the simple answer is that both should be treated equally.
Unless exception to confidentiality is conflated with exception to the
evidentiary privilege, however, neither would lose protection of the
evidentiary privilege except in proceedings necessary to protect a potential
victim.
There is, however, an argument more powerful than that made by the
Wharton court for linking the Tarasoffexception to confidentiality with
exception to the evidentiary privilege. It might be argued that, whatever
importance confidentiality has for maintaining the integrity and consequent
social utility of the therapeutic relationship, once exception has been made
for warning in exigent circumstances, maintaining the evidentiary privilege
with regard to the same communications has reduced value. That is, once
a confidence is or can be revealed in one context, the remaining value to the
therapeutic relationship in protecting the confidence in other contexts
diminishes significantly. That diminished interest in partial protection of the
confidence, one might conclude, no longer outweighs the public interest in
truth-finding during a trial against the patient. Because any chilling effect
resulting from a Tarasoffwarningwould not be significantly increased by
the further loss of the evidentiary privilege, why sacrifice the evidentiary
value of the therapist's testimony regarding her patient's confidential
communications? This argument turns, however, on what amounts
102. People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290, 308 (Cal. 1991).
103. Or, at least, it should not be. See infra notes 133-44 and accompanying text.
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essentially to a fact-specific, case-by-case balancing of the value of
therapeutic confidence against evidentiary truth finding-once again, the
very kind of balancing rejected by the Supreme Court in Jaffee.
Even assuming, contrary to Jaffee, that this case-by-case balancing is
appropriate, the assumption that loss of the evidentiary privilege adds little
to the chilling effect on the therapeutic relationship already exacted by the
Tarasoff disclosure duty appears faulty when examined from the
perspective of an incipient therapeutic relationship. On the one hand, there
would be what has presumably become a commonplace of ethical
disclosure, a Tarasoffwarningthat, while the patient's communications will
be generally kept in strictest confidence, there could be circumstances under
which the therapist would have a duty to reveal those confidences to the
extent necessary to protect the patient or another person. On the other hand,
if exception to the evidentiary privilege is coupled with the Tarasoffduty,
one can imagine a quite different and more chilling warning: "while our
conversations will generally be kept in confidence, you should know that,
if you reveal to me an intention to harm another person, I may have a duty
to take steps to protect that person and might also be forced to testify in
later court proceedings to what you said." Commentators from the
psychotherapeutic community, not surprisingly, find a substantial difference
in those two scenarios.10 4
The explicit limits placed on the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
most jurisdictions negate the rationale for linking the Tarasoffduty with the
exception to the evidentiary privilege. As noted above, Proposed Rule 504
makes exception to the privilege for hospitalization proceedings, mental
examinations ordered by a judge, and any proceeding where the patient's
mental or emotional condition is an element of a claim or defense raised by
the patient."' Nearly all states make these and/or other exceptions to the
privilege."0 6 If the fact that there are exceptions to confidentiality and
104. See supra note 101.
105. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
106. See Alaska R. Evid. 504(d); Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 32-2085(A) (West 1997); Ark. R. Evid.
503(d); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(3) (West 1998); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146c(c) (West 1991);
Del. Unif. R. Evid. 503(d); D.C. Code Ann. § 14-307(b) (Michie 1998); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.503(4)
(West 1999); Haw. R. Evid. 504.1(d); Idaho R. Evid. 503(d); 225 Il1. Comp. Stat. Ann. 15/5 (West
1998); Iowa Code Ann. § 622.10 (West 1998); Ky. R. Evid. 507(c); La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 510(13)(2)
(West 1995); Me. R. Evid. 503(e); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-109(d) (Michie 1997); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 233, § 20B(a) (Law. Co-op. 1986); Miss. R. Evid. 503(d); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27504(4) (Michie 1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:14B-28 (West 1998); N.M. R. Evid. 11-504(D); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 8-53.3 (Michie 1997); N.D. R. Evid. § 503(d); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.02(B)(1) (Anderson
1995); RI. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-4(b) (Michie 1997); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-95(C) (West 1997); S.D.
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privilege, including the Tarasoffdisclosure duty, defeats the value of the
privilege, there would be no reason to maintain the privilege in the first
place. The legislatures for the fifty states and the Supreme Court in Jaffee
have, however, made a policy judgment that a privilege with conditions and
exceptions is worth having, despite the consequent loss to the truth-finding
function of the courts.
An additional distinction between the Tarasoff exception to
confidentiality and exception to the evidentiary privilege should be taken
into account before the two are equated. While the Supreme Court in Jaffee
emphasized the utility of the evidentiary privilege to the effectiveness of the
therapeutic relationship, the privilege also implicates the patient's privacy
interests. 7 Exception to the evidentiary privilege would exact a much
greater burden on that privacy interest than does the therapist's Tarasoff
duty to breach confidentiality. A therapist's Tarasoffwarning typically
entails notification only to law enforcement authorities and/or the potential
victim that the patient poses a danger. It does not typically require a
repetition of the patient's confidential statements to the therapist, but merely
private notice that the patient may be a threat to the potential victim's
safety. Exception to the evidentiary privilege, on the other hand, would
entail the therapist's public testimony to the most intimate details of the
patient's dangerous thoughts that have been shared with the therapist.
Sharing of such thoughts is, of course, encouraged by the therapeutic
process in an atmosphere of utmost confidence and safety for the very
purpose of allowing the therapist to intervene and help the patient
successfully manage those thoughts. Hearing those thoughts played back in
a public courtroom and used to create a criminal case against the patient
would be a drastic infringement on the patient's legitimate expectation
of privacy.'0 8
The benefits and burdens of the Tarasoffexception to confidentiality and
the dangerous patient exception to the evidentiary privilege are dramatically
Codified Laws §§ 19-13-9 to 19-13-11 (Michie 1995); Tex. R. Civil Evid. 509(e); Utah R. Evid. 506(d);
Vt R Evid. 503(d); Va Code Ann. § 8.01-400.2 (Miechie 1992); v. Va. Code § 27-3-1(b) (1992); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 905.04(4) (West 1993); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-27-123(a) (Michie 1997); see also supra
note 46 and accompanying text (some state statutes afford psychotherapist-patient privilege same
protection as attorney-client privilege, which is subject to exceptions).
107. See supranote 86.
108. One commentator has even argued that "statements made by the patient to his therapist that are
then introduced in court by the therapist should be regarded as coming from the patient himself" for
Fifth Amendment purposes. Courville, supranote 86, at 205.
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different. There is simply no compelling reason to equate or inseparably
link them. Unfortunately, without analyzing or even acknowledging the
significant distinctions between the two exceptions, the Jaffee footnote
appears to have done just that. As demonstrated in United States v. Glass, °9
the footnote has at least left itself open to that interpretation. When the
dangerous patient exception to the evidentiary privilege is analyzed
separately, it finds support in the Tarasoffprotective rationale only where
disclosure of the confidential client communications during the evidentiary
proceeding proves necessary to avert a serious, future threat of harm to an
identifiable potential victim or the patient.
B.

The Waiver Rationale

An alternative justification for exception to the evidentiary privilege,
related to the Tarasoffdisclosure rationale and accepted by the Supreme
Court of California in Wharton, provides that once confidences are
disclosed to prevent harm (or presumably for any other reason), any
attendant privilege has been waived for evidentiary purposes thereafter.
Relying on its previous opinion in People v. Clark,"' the Wharton court
held that once confidential communications are revealed by the therapist to
a third party, such communications lose their confidential status."' This
waiver rationale is narrower than the Tarasoffrationale because it would
apply only where disclosure was actually made rather than where it could
have been made.
The waiver rationale articulated in Wharton ignored, however, the fact
that in California, as elsewhere, the patient rather than the therapist holds
3
the privilege." 2 Only the holder of a privilege can waive that privilege."

109. 133 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (10th Cir. 1998).
110. 789 P.2d 127 (Cal. 1990) (en bane).
111. People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290, 307 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (quoting Clark, 789 P.2d 127).
112. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1013 (West 1995); ProposedRules, supranote 2, at 241 (Proposed Rule
504(c): "The privilege may be claimed by the patient, by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal
representative of a deceased patient. The person who was the psychotherapist may claim the privilege
but only on behalf of the patient.").
113. See 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's FederalEvidence § 511.04[1], at
511-6 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1998) ("The holder ofaprivilege can waive the privilege by
voluntarily disclosing the privileged information.") (emphasis added); ProposedRules, supra note 2,
at 258 (Proposed Rule 511: "A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of
the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or
communication.") (emphasis added).
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Without specifically rejecting its holding in Wharton, the Supreme Court of
California, in Menendez, criticized the lower court for relying on the waiver
rationale and neglecting this basic concept. The Menendez court stated:
[T]he superior court's reading of Clark suggests that the patient's
privacy is breached and the psychotherapeutic relationship destroyed
as soon as any communication loses its "confidential" status in any
degree. Such a proposition is unsupported.... [O]nly the patient has
4
the power to cause the privilege to go out of existence in its entirety."
Indeed, even if the therapist were considered a joint holder of the privilege,
the therapist's voluntary disclosure of a confidential communication would
not waive the patient's continuing privilege." 5 Moreover, unlike an
attorney, who although not the holder of the privilege may waive the
attorney-client privilege as the client's agent, the therapist is not the
patient's agent.
One might argue, nonetheless, that the patient has impliedly consented
to the psychotherapist's Tarasoffdisclosure.Such disclosure is arguably in
the patient's interest, because it is made to prevent the patient from doing
or suffering harm. Indeed, the therapist, in the course of good practice, may
well have informed the patient that such disclosure might be required.
Considering a doctrine of implied consent merely points out once again,
however, the significant difference between a Tarasoff breach of
confidentiality and exception to the evidentiary privilege. It is one thing to
infer that a patient has consented to the psychotherapist taking steps to
prevent harm and quite another to infer that the patient,the holder of the
privilege, has consented to the psychotherapist testifying to the patient's
confidential communications in criminal proceedings against the patient
after harm has occurred.
C.

The Attorney-ClientAnalogy

As noted above, several states have defined their psychotherapist-patient
privilege as co-extensive with the attorney-client privilege. It might be
argued in those jurisdictions and elsewhere, by analogy to the attorney-

114. Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786, 794 (Cal. 1992).
115. See In re Scranton Corp., 37 F.R.D. 465, 469-70 (M.D. Pa. 1965); 3 Weinstein & Berger, supra
note 113, § 511.08[1], at 511-10 ("When two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege, the case
law in most jurisdictions finds that a waiver by one holder does not waive the privilege as to other
holders.") (citing John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A, 913 F.2d 544,555-56 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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or "future crime"
client privilege, that there should be a "crime-fraud"
1 16
privilege.
psychotherapist-patient
exception to the
The federal "crime-fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege
exempts from protection any "communications 'made for the purpose of
getting advice for the commission of a fraud' or crime."'" 17 The rationale
behind the exception is that a criminal or fraudulent purpose perverts the
legitimate purposes of the attorney's services. The conditions of this
exception, if applied by analogy in the psychotherapist-patient context
would, one suspects, rarely be met. A patient who expresses criminal intent
to a psychotherapist would rarely be doing so for the purpose of soliciting
advice or aid in carrying out that desire; rather, the patient would typically
do so for the opposite purpose-to get help in dealing with the desire so as
not to carry it out.
Some jurisdictions recognize, in addition to the crime-fraud exception,
a broader exception for "conversations regarding the contemplation of a
future crime.""..8 The California Evidence Code, for example, in addition to
providing a crime-fraud exception' provides that:
There is no privilege under this article if the lawyer reasonably
believes that disclosure of any confidential communication relating to
116. The majority of federal circuits have also recognized an exception to the husband-wife privilege
that "will permit a witness-spouse to testify about confidential communications involving present or
ongoing crimes in which both spouses were joint participants at the time the communications were
made." 3 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 113, § 505.1 1[2][a], at 505-18; see also Murl A. Larkin,
FederalTestimonial Privileges§ 4.02[5], at 4-19 (Release No. 21-1/96) ("There is some authority that
the privilege is lost to even the witness spouse when the spouses were joint participants in ongoing or
future criminal activity.") (citations omitted).
Whether there is an exception to the clergy-communicator privilege for prevention of harm, like the
dangerous patient exception to the therapist-patient privilege, remains undecided. As stated by the Third
Circuit in upholding the existence of the clergy-communicator privilege: "The precise scope of the
privilege and its additional facets, such as whether a clergy-person should be required to disclose
confidential communications when harm to innocent parties is threatened and imminent, are.., most
suitably left to case-by-case evolution." In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 (3d Cir.
1990); see also 3 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 113, § 506.10, at 506-17 (quoting Grand Jury
Investigationas demonstration of"unsettled issues" with regard to clergy-communicator privilege).
117. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (quoting O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A.C.
481, 604 (P.C.)); see also3 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 113, § 503.3 1[l], at 503-91 ("[T]he lawyerclient privilege does not extend to communications between a client and the client's attorney that are
in furtherance of future or ongoing criminal or fraudulent conduct.").
118. State v. Hansen, 102 Wash. 2d 712, 720, 862 P.2d 117, 121 (1993) (en banc) (allowing
testimony of attorney regarding threat by potential client against judge in prosecution under statute
prohibiting intimidation ofjudge). In Hansen, the court also held that there was no privilege because no
attorney-client relationship had ever been established. Id.
119. See Cal. Evid. Code § 956 (West 1995).
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representation of a client is necessary to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
death or substantial bodily harm.2
This broader exception has apparently not been applied as a matter of
federal law. 2 '
Because the attorney-client privilege protects only confidential
communications relevant to the legitimate purpose of giving legal advice,
a broad exception for communications regarding future crime makes some
sense. As noted by the Supreme Court in enunciating the crime-fraud
exception in Zolin: "[T]he reason for the protection-the centrality of open
client and attorney communication to the proper functioning of our

adversary system ofjustice---'ceas[es] to operate at a certain point, namely,
where the desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoing, but future
wrongdoing.'"' At that point, attorney-client communications no longer
serve the legitimate professional purpose of the attorney-client relationship.
Even if one accepts this broader "future-crime" exception as efficacious

in the attorney-client context, there are significant differences between the
psychotherapist-patient and attorney-client relationships that make the
analogy suspect."u "Future crime" is a legitimate subject of legal advice
only to the extent that the lawyer may be consulted to determine what is and
what is not a crime. Beyond that, communications regarding future crime
are outside the scope of the attorney's professional purpose. By contrast,
communications regarding intentions or desires to commit future crime are
at the very heart of why a patient may seek psychotherapeutic care. A
120. Cal. Evid. Code § 956.5. The exception applied by the California Evidence Code in the attorneyclient context is similar to that which it articulates in the psychotherapist-patient context See discussion
of Cal. Evid. Code § 1024 (West 1995), supra Part ll.B. It is also similar to Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.6(b)(1), which allows but does not require an attorney to reveal confidential client
information "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary... to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm." This exception to the lawyer's ethical duty of confidentiality is a separate issue, and would
not control the question of whether the same confidences would be protected by the evidentiary privilege
in criminal or civil proceedings against the client.
121. See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States §§ 8:1 to 8:16 (1993)
("Exceptions to the Privilege"); 3 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 113, §§ 503.01-.18 ("Lawyer-Client
Privilege") (failing to note future crime exception).
122. 491 U.S. at 562-63 (quoting 8 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, § 2298, at 573
(J. McNaughton ed. 1961)).
123. The Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence noted that "[t]he exceptions
[to Proposed Rule 504] differ substantially from those of the attorney-client privilege, as a result of the
basic differences in the relationships." Proposed Rules, supra note 2, at 243-44.
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patient may reveal these dangerous, criminal impulses to the therapist for
the very purpose of overcoming and not acting upon them.'24
Whether or not the patient is truly seeking help to overcome these
impulses (a determination that would, in any event, be excruciatingly
difficult if not impossible to make), revealing them to the therapist creates
an opportunity for intervention that is central to the psychotherapist's
professional purpose. As the drafters of the Connecticut statute concluded,
a patient's expression to a psychiatrist of the intent to commit a crime is
usually "a plea for help" and "[t]he very making of these pleas affords the
psychiatrist his unique opportunity to work with patients in an attempt to
resolve their problems."' 25 Examined from this perspective, protecting the
dangerous patient's ability to obtain confidential professional help protects
the potential victim as well as the patient. As one commentator has noted,
the drafters of Proposed Rule 504 assumed "that
less harm will ensue if
26
patients feel free to ventilate their intentions.',
There is no compelling reason to equate the psychotherapist's duty to
breach confidentiality to protect potential victims with the dangerous patient
exception to the evidentiary privilege. Nor is the evidentiary exception
properly analogized to the crime-fraud or future crime exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege. The dangerous patient exception should, therefore,
be evaluated separately and the terms of the Jaffee footnote strictly applied.
That is, exception to the evidentiary privilege should be made only if "a
serious threat of harrn to the patient or others can be averted only by means
of disclosure by the therapist" in testimony at the time of the proceeding.
IV. APPLYING THE EXCEPTION: PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS
AND THE PROSECUTION OF THREATS
When, if ever, should the dangerous patient evidentiary exception apply?
Unlike a criminal prosecution against a patient who has allegedly carried
out a threat confided to a psychotherapist, certain evidentiary proceedings

124. One might argue that some clients will make revelations to an attorney for the same reasonthey want to be talked out of it. If so, the client is not seeking legal advice from the lawyer so much as
counseling or therapy, which is the explicit purpose of the psychotherapeutic relationship. Some might
contend that the attorney-client relationship should be broadly conceived to include such counseling as
part of its legitimate purpose. That contention would merely support, however, an argument that there
should be no future crime exception to the attorney-client privilege, as appears to be the case in the
federal courts and most state jurisdictions.
125. Goldstein & Katz, supranote 17, at 188.
126. 2 Weinstein & Berger, supranote 19, § 504[04], at 504-27.
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may have a protective purpose akin to that of the Tarasoffdisclosure duty.
A restraining order proceeding, by which the potential victim attempts to
get a court order preventing contact by the dangerous patient, may be a
direct outgrowth of a Tarasoffwarning from the therapist. For the same
reasons that justify the warning, it makes sense that the therapist be
compelled to testify in proceedings by which the victim seeks court and law
enforcement protection in response to notification of the threat. Proceedings
to hospitalize a dangerous patient, although perhaps not focused on a
specific victim, have a similar protective purpose to prevent harm to
potential victims and/or the patient herself. Proposed Rule 504 and many
state statutes make exception to the therapist-patient privilege for
hospitalization proceedings.'27 Testimony by a therapist in a restraining
order or hospitalization proceeding will often meet the terms of the Jaffee
footnote as strictly applied. It may well be that "a serious threat of harm to
the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the
therapist" in that proceeding.
It might be argued that criminal proceedings against a patient that punish
threats of violence have a similar protective purpose. Unlike prosecuting a
completed crime, prosecuting threats presumably serves the purpose, not
only of punishment or general deterrence, but of prevention of the specific
threat from being carried out. The threatener is disabled through
incarceration.
Although it did not require or discuss a protective purpose as a predicate
to applying a dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the Tenth Circuit's decision in UnitedStates v. Glass'29 could be
rationalized in this way. Unlike a typical criminal proceeding against a
patient, where the government may seek to introduce a patient's threat
communicated confidentially to a therapist as evidence of intent or plan to
commit the charged crime, in Glass the confidential threat was itself the
crime. 3' It could be argued that the statute at issue in Glass, 18 U.S.C.
§ 871, and prosecutions for violation of that statute serve a protective

127. See supra note 95. Proposed Rule 504(d)(1) provides: "There is no privilege underthis rule for
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the
psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in need of
hospitalization." ProposedRules, supra note 2, at 241.
128. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996).
129. 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998); see supraPart I.A.
130. See supratext accompanying notes 34-35.
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purpose that justifies exception to the privilege-the purpose of protecting
the President by locking up those who would threaten him or her. The
legislative history of the statute, scant though it is, supports this
conclusion.13'
Applying the dangerous patient exception in threat cases like Glass
would present the anomaly that proof of the charged threat would not
depend on the circumstances of the alleged crime, but on the circumstances
prevailing at the time of trial. Compelling the psychotherapist's testimony
would be justified only if the defendant posed a serious threat to an
identifiable victim at the time of trial. However, depending on the penal
statute at issue, the charged crime typically would consist of a threat that
was serious when made whether or not there was a continuing danger at the
time of trial. Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 871, the statute at issue in Glass, has been
interpreted as not requiring that the defendant ever had a serious intention
to carry out the threat or the means to do so.' 32
It is, however, unnecessary to confront this dilemma, at least where, as
in Glass, the allegation of a "threat" is based solely on statements made in
confidence to a psychotherapist. One should first ask whether the statements
at issue are "threats" or evidence of threats at all. The pertinent question in
Glass, not addressed by the Tenth Circuit, should have been whether, even
without regard to the privilege, a patient's statements made only to a
psychotherapist in confidence are admissible as the sole evidence of a threat
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871.
Examining 18 U.S.C. § 871 and the meaning of "threat" as interpreted
in that statute is instructive. The original statute upon which section 871 is
based was enacted by Congress in 1917.131 One year later, it was interpreted
in United States v. Stobo to include oral threats whether or not actually
131. See H.R. Rep. No. 652, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) ("This bill is designed to restrain and
punish those who would threaten to take the life of, or inflict bodily harm upon, the President of this
Republic. It is the first and highest duty of a Government to protect its governmental agencies, in the
performance of their public services .. ") (emphasis added); 1916 Cong. Rec. at 9377 ("I can say to
my friend that for 25 years threatening letters have come in the White House mail, and something ought
to be done in the way of protecting the Chief Executive of this great Republic, if possible, from this kind
of annoyance.").
132. See, e.g., United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247, 1256 (10th Cir. 1983) (approving jury
instruction stating that "it is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to carry out the threat,
nor is it necessary to prove that the defendant actually had the apparent ability to carry out the threat").
133. See 39 Stat. 919, ch. 64. The original statute was virtually identical to the current statute except
that it punished only threats against the President whereas the current statute has been amended to
include threats against the Vice President, the President-elect and others in the line of succession to the
presidency. See 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1994).
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communicated or intended to be communicated to the President. 3 4 Stobo
also held, however, that "[a]n oral threat against the President, unheard by
any one, cannot constitute the threat denounced by the statute." '35 The court
went on the explain the requirements of the statute regarding oral threats:
In an oral threat contemplated by the statute there are two essential
elements: First, the utterance of the words, and, secondly, the hearing
of the words by some person or persons other than the utterer. The use
of the threateningwords in an unheardsoliloquy, whatever may be
the intent orpurpose with which they are uttered, is not an offense
punishableunder the act. Its manifest purpose was to punish the use
by one of threateningwords calculatedto inflame or have a sinister
influence upon the minds of others, and in the case of an oral threat
the offense is not complete unless the words are uttered in the hearing
of some other person or persons.'36
This explanation of the statute's purpose is consistent with statements by
the legislation's sponsors in congressional
debates, who emphasized the
13 7
effect on listeners of a public threat.
The Tenth Circuit, in decisions prior to Glass, consistent with the
legislative purpose of the statute, had approved jury instructions defining
"[t]he term 'threat' [to mean] an avowed present determination or intent to
injure presently or in the future." ' As explained in UnitedStates v. Smith:
The key word used in the instruction, "avowed," means "openly
acknowledged or declared." We believe a fair reading of the
instruction requires the jury to find that the defendant had openly
declared a present intention to injure the President-which is nothing
more than requiring the jury to find that defendant declared to others
an "apparent determination" to injure the President, language this
Court has previously approved. Requiring that the defendant's
134. 251 F. 689, 691-92 (D. Del. 1918).
135. Id. at 695.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. The Congressional Record states:
A bad man can make a public threat, and put somebody else up to committing a crime against the
Chief Executive, and that is where the harm comes. The man who makes the threat is not himself
very dangerous, but he is liable to put devilment in the mind of some poor fellow who does try to
harm him.
53 Cong. Rec. 9377 (1916) (statement of Rep. Webb).
138. United States v. Smith, 670 F.2d 921,922-23 (10th Cir. 1982); accordUnited States v. Dysart,
705 F.2d 1247, 1256 (10th Cir. 1983).
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intention be "apparent" or "avowed" is intended to preclude
conviction if the defendant keeps secret an intention to harm the
President.3 9
The Third Circuit found similarly, in United States v. Kosma, that "section
871 would not punish a person who writes a threatening letter to the
President and places it in his desk with no intention of sending it."141
A prosecution for a threat that is, as in Glass, based solely on a
confidential statement made by a patient to a psychotherapist, presents the
question of whether such a statement is one that is "avowed" or "openly
acknowledged or declared" such that it can constitute a "threat" within the
meaning of the statute. Or is such a statement a secret intention that is-like
an unheard soliloquy, a journal entry, or a letter never sent-not punishable
under the statute? As noted by the Tenth Circuit in an earlier decision
presenting similar facts, United States v. Crews, prosecution of a patient for
confidential communications to his therapist presents the anomaly of
making criminal "verbal communication of the type that may be expected
or even encouraged in a psychiatric setting, because the' 4treating physician
needs to know what the patient is thinking or feeling.' '
Prosecutions based on confidential statements to a psychotherapist come
perilously close to prosecuting the patient for having bad thoughts or a
mental illness. To do so would not fulfill the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 871,
to punish those who communicate threats directly to the President or to
others who may be incited against the President. Rather, such prosecutions
would discourage those with dangerous secret thoughts from seeking
professional help to defuse them. 4 ' The statement by Glass to his
psychiatrist 43 did not constitute "threatening words calculated to inflame
or have a sinister influence upon the minds of others."'" Glass made his
statement in a confidential, therapeutic setting, not for the purpose of
inciting the admitting psychotherapist, but rather in a voluntary effort to
obtain help in managing his emotions and impulses. 4 '

139. Smith, 670 F.2d at 923 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
140. 951 F.2d 549, 558 (3d Cir. 1991).
141. 781 F.2d 826, 831 (10th Cir. 1986).
142. Cf Leong et al., supra note 101, at 1014 (noting that possibility of being called as witness in
criminal prosecution "will likely further distance psychotherapists from treating difficult and dangerous
patients").
143. See United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1357 (10th Cir. 1998).
144. United States v. Stobo, 251 F. 689, 695 (D. Del. 1918).
145. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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Because statements to a therapist like those in Glass are private and
confidential, not openly acknowledged or declared, they should not be
considered "threats" or relevant evidence of threats within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 871 or similar statutes. For that reason, the privilege issue with
regard to such statements should not arise, and it should be unnecessary to
consider whether prosecutions for threats have a protective purpose
sufficient to justify a dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapistpatient privilege.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Jaffee footnote and the decisions of the Supreme Court of California
in Wharton and Menendez appear to equate exception to the evidentiary
privilege with exception to confidentiality incident to the psychotherapist's
Tarasoffduty to prevent patients from doing foreseeable harm to others.
The justification for allowing or requiring a psychotherapist to disclose
client confidences to law enforcement authorities or potential victims when
a serious threat is pending-protection of the potential victim or the
patient-will not normally pertain, however, in later court proceedings
against the patient. Exception to the evidentiary privilege is justified for
testimony in a restraining order proceeding or in a proceeding to hospitalize
the patient, the purposes of which are to protect the potential victims, the
patient, or the public. No similar justification exists, however, for
compelling a therapist to testify against her patient in a criminal proceeding
after the threat of harm has been carried out or is no longer viable.
There is also no compelling reason why the two exceptions must be
linked. The burdens on the therapeutic relationship of the two exceptions
are substantially different as is their social utility, and allowing or requiring
Tarasoffdisclosuredoes not render insignificant the remaining protection
of the evidentiary privilege. Moreover, unlike in the attorney-client context,
where communications regarding future crime are outside the legitimate
scope of the attorney's professional purpose, communications regarding a
patient's violent intentions or desires are crucial to effective
psychotherapeutic care and protect the potential victim as well as the
patient. The Jaffee footnote should, therefore, be strictly construed, and the
dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege should
apply only where harm to an identifiable victim can be averted by
compelling the therapist to testify in the proceeding at issue.
The Supreme Court in Jaffee, following the lead of the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee and state legislatures, made a policy judgment that the
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value of protecting the confidentiality of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship outweighs the evidentiary value of admitting a patient's
confidential statements for the purpose of proving criminal conduct by the
patient. The powerful and salutary impulse to protect potential victims that
gave rise to the Tarasoffduty to warn should not be allowed to distort the
consistent application of that policy judgment. Indeed, the rationale
supporting that judgment includes the belief that protection of the
therapeutic relationship will result in less patient violence.

